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n 11 September 2007, the Spanish Prime Minister José Zapatero told his country that 
Spain had entered the “Champions’ League of world economies”. One has to resist the 
malicious urge to feel a certain schadenfreude at such an uncanny combination of hubris 
and bad timing.  
Nine years later, not only has the Spanish economy failed to reach its pre-crisis peak, but the 
political system appears to be in shambles as well. Seven months after the last elections, 
Spanish citizens are being asked to vote again, because no one has managed to put together a 
government.  
A closer look at the country’s situation, however, produces a much more nuanced view. Both 
in politics and in economics, Spain resides at an inflection point situated between the European 
periphery and its core. If it plays its cards right, it has a fighting chance of re-joining the 
Champions’ League, a development that would have a tremendously positive message for the 
rest of Southern and Eastern Europe. 
On the negative side, Spain is, with Italy, the only European country that could realistically 
break up the eurozone if the worst were to happen. So what is likely to happen if Podemos, 
Spain’s counterpart to Greece’s SYRIZA, surpasses the traditional Socialist Party and leads the 
next government? 
This essay takes stock of the new world of Spanish politics one month before the early 
elections, which should take place on June 26th. It explores the main policy challenges that the 
next government is going to face and the likelihood that they are going to be addressed. Before 
plunging into the details of Spanish election campaign, let’s first put the issues into a long-
term European economic context.   
O 
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Which league for Spain? 
Spain is still the economic leader of the European periphery. (We exclude Italy, which, for 
purposes of this type of analysis is effectively two countries in one.) The figure below shows 
GDP per capita for the EU member states from the South and wealthier members from the 
East. The picture shows a remarkable convergence over the last decade to somewhere between 
70 and 85% of EU average income per capita. Spain is the only exception, having stabilised at 
above 90% and is now restarting the convergence process.  
Figure 1. Convergence of GDP per capita in selected EU member states in South and East,  
1995-2017 (EU average = 100) 
 
Source: AMECO. 
While countries like Estonia, Lithuania or Slovakia managed a remarkable growth 
performance since the enlargement, they are still at the bottom of what one could call Europe’s 
No 2 League. On the other hand, the Czech Republic and Slovenia, countries that have long 
been on par with Portugal and Greece, have not managed sustained convergence since the 
enlargement. So it would be somewhat premature for an Estonian or a Slovak Prime Minister 
to predict that their country will join the Champions’ League sometime in the next decade. 
While it is by no means easy to get to the top half of the No 2 League, it is even tougher to 
break out of the periphery and join the core. 
Spanish politicians, civil servants, think-tankers and academics with whom I have recently 
spoken during a week-long visit to the country might not have this figure taped to their wall, 
but they are unified in speaking about the need to find a “new economic growth model”. 
Despite major differences on the exact prescription for change and (sometimes) virulent 
mutual dislike, they agree on much of the diagnosis. 
The internal debate among Spain’s elites on the new model is very sophisticated in at least two 
ways. First of all, it does not treat the crisis as a temporary aberration on an otherwise steady 
and guaranteed ascent towards success, but rather as a wake-up call that requires a 
comprehensive review of “how things always worked”. Secondly, it goes beyond the usual 
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talk about the need for improved labour market, education and innovation performance and 
links these together with the need for a radical institutional upgrade of the Spanish state. 
In other words, the Spaniards with whom I spoke understand that Champions’ League 
education and innovation performance are conditional on improved governance. This applies 
to a variety of areas ranging from corruption of local and regional politicians and public 
participation in politics and policy-making through (in)efficiency of public administration and 
selection procedures of academics at the universities to strengthening competition by 
weakening oligopolies in energy, oil and telecommunications markets. 
This recognition, however, also makes the politics of forming a government very difficult. 
Spain now has four major parties instead of two, and they do not line up neatly along the left-
right axis with regard to these key issues. As a result, the country’s politics have become a 
three-dimensional puzzle. 
Deadlock and the 3D puzzle 
Spain is now in the midst of a major political transition. Ever since the 1982 victory of Felipe 
González, national politics have been dominated by two parties – the Popular Party (PP) and 
the Socialist Party (PSOE) – one of which has always governed alone in the past, although 
sometimes supported by smaller regional parties.  
In the December 2015 parliamentary elections, two new parties – Podemos and Ciudadanos – 
broke this duopoly. As Funke et al. (2015) note, this fragmentation is not unusual following a 
financial crisis, although Spain is unusual in not having a successful far-right party. Even 
though traditional parties managed (barely) to keep the 1st and 2nd place, they were no longer 
able to form a government on their own. Except for a grand coalition of PP and PSOE, no two 
parties could form a majority coalition either.  
Since the opposition ran on a tough platform against PP and especially against its leader 
Mariano Rajoy, who is widely perceived as arrogant, out-of-touch and even corrupt, no one 
wanted to join a PP government, especially after Rajoy refused to step down. PSOE tried to 
put together a centre-left government with Ciudadanos and Podemos, even managing to 
hammer out a detailed 200-point agreement with Ciudadanos. But, unfortunately, Podemos 
refused to join or even support this government. And so the country must now move onto 
new elections… 
Seems like a clear case of politicians’ short-sighted squabbling, no? Actually, probably not. 
First of all, the art of coalition-building is new, not just to Spanish politicians, but also to 
Spanish voters. While the people wanted a government, it seemed that they would not forgive 
their party if it gave up on its core values and messages. This is particularly true for the new 
parties. 
Secondly, the 3D political game presents an unusually complicated puzzle.  
One dimension is the traditional left-right division on economic and social policy. It is there 
that the four parties align most neatly, with PP and Ciudadanos on the right, PSOE on the 
moderate left and Podemos anywhere from left to loony left, depending on your point of view. 
However, even there one can hear the rumbles of a generational war that cuts across the left-
right divide. The PP government made major cuts in public expenditure, but (like 
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Conservatives in the UK, but also nominally left-wing SMER in Slovakia), protected its core 
electoral group, namely pensioners.  
Spain is also facing a new vs. old political division, reflected both among voters and political 
priorities. While PP and PSOE still have a lock on older voters, they are nearly extinct among 
people below 35, where Podemos and Ciudadanos reign. In addition to the people who feel 
socially excluded and politically disenfranchised, Podemos can also boast millions of 
educated, employed middle-class young Spaniards who are fed up with the system, or as 
Podemos calls it, with “La Casta”.  
This division not only reflects a distrust on the part of younger voters of traditional politicians, 
but also policy priorities of the new parties. Whether they are talking of participation, anti-
corruption or democratic regeneration, both the leaders and the voters of the upstarts 
emphasise that they are intent not just on seeing new faces, but also new rules of the game.  
And as if these cleavages were not enough, Spaniards and their politicians are also divided by 
the nationalities’ issue, which is manifested particularly strongly with regard to the Catalonian 
issue. While Catalonians are becoming independence-minded, only Podemos is sympathetic 
to those aspirations, while the other three parties (and most Spaniards) consider it an 
extremely dangerous game, with the very destiny of the country itself at stake.  
The election results depend on which of the dimensions prevails in voters’ minds as they go 
to the polls.  
The currently governing PP is betting on its hard-won reputation for economic competence 
and fear of communists (as they like to paint Podemos). After gruelling austerity, Spain is 
currently among the fastest-growing European economies, but there is a familiar gap between 
start of the economic turnaround and the time when voters genuinely begin to appreciate it. 
On the other hand, PP has implemented a tough programme of expenditure cuts in welfare, 
education and health, which tends to be politically lethal when coupled with corruption 
scandals. As a result, PP’s share of the vote declined from the previous 45% to 28% in the 
December 2015 election. No one, including its enemies, expects it will go much lower and if it 
succeeds in its campaign of polarisation, it can even go up.  
The Socialist PSOE has been one of the most successful left-wing political machines in Western 
Europe over the past 35 years in its ability to bring together blue-collar and white-collar voters. 
But now that has turned into a liability, and PSOE appears to be caught in the middle, between 
both the past and the future, and the left and the right. Its travails are similar to the problems 
facing Social Democrats across Europe or Hillary Clinton, but with 22% of the vote in the 
December election, they cannot afford to lose more ground.  
Their biggest nemesis is Podemos (“Yes we can”), the party that is the most difficult to pin 
down since it is rooted in Latin American left-wing populism, Spanish Marxist-Leninist 
tradition as well as more recent social movements, such as the celebrated protests of May 15, 
2011. Even its members and voters have different views on exactly what positions it would 
take in government. Its origins can be traced to NGOs, academia and social movements and 
its leaders place strong emphasis on participatory politics. It has disturbing links to Venezuela 
and some other regimes of ill-repute, and when it negotiated with PSOE, it reportedly 
requested ministries of hard power rather than social, education or labour portfolios. Many 
Spaniards trust it as the only force able to break the lock of “La Casta” on Spanish politics. At 
the moment, it is concentrating on achieving “Sorpasso”, receiving one more vote and seat 
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than PSOE. Its obvious role model is SYRIZA and its replacement of PASOK in Greece, but 
the economic and political situation in Spain does not appear to favour such a radical shift.  
The last and, at the moment, the least of the big parties is Ciudadanos (Citizens). Although it 
has existed since 2006, until recently it was an obscure Catalonian party fighting Catalonian 
nationalism. Then it was catapulted into national politics by a combination of an extremely 
charismatic leader (Albert Rivera) and the demand for political change by disappointed PP 
and PSOE voters who are more liberal and anti-nationalist than Podemos fans. As one of its 
MPs told me, Ciudadanos is an “OECD party” of “best practice” policy ideas, unencumbered 
by too much ideological baggage. In the Netherlands or Denmark, it could be reformist Social 
Democrats and no one would bat an eyelash.  
What does Spain need to do to join the Champions’ League? 
All parties, with the possible exception of Podemos, are fully aware that fiscal sovereignty is 
the first condition of any ambitious modernisation effort. Between 2010 and 2014, Spain 
reduced its structural fiscal deficit from more than 7% of GDP to less than 2%. Since the 
economy’s performance falls far below its potential, the headline fiscal deficit is still around 
5%. The debt is stabilising around a high 100% of GDP. The pre-election political concerns and 
post-election uncertainty led to a slightly more-expansive policy and since the headline deficit 
is still above the 3% threshold, the European Commission is soon going to recommend tougher 
action than it has previously. On the other hand, continuing growth should mean that Spain 
meets the 3% benchmark in 2017, even without much additional effort.  
Spain is sick and tired of austerity, but despite the trauma of the crisis and the semi-rescue by 
the EU, Spain remains one of the most pro-European member states. As one observer told me: 
“Spaniards blame their own politicians and bankers, not Europe, for the mess.” But he also 
adds that “we did not expect Europe to be such a tough mother”. 
There seems to be confidence that a combination of the country’s size and reform efforts 
should give it some wiggle room on the speed of further fiscal consolidation. Both PSOE and 
Podemos have openly expressed a willingness to increase taxes to achieve this, arguing that 
Spain collects significantly below the EU average in tax revenues. If Podemos led the 
government, there is even a possibility that it would engage in a ‘game of chicken’ over fiscal 
policy, especially if the inexperienced Podemos leadership miscalculated the European 
response. There appears to be little likelihood of this actually happening, however, and in any 
case, Podemos would probably not be able to form a government with such a radical 
programme with either PSOE or Ciudadanos.  
There is general agreement that education, innovation and reform of the labour market are 
crucial policy areas for the next government to tackle. 
In education, there is also a large consensus on unimpressive outcomes (e.g. in PISA), high 
drop-out rates in upper-secondary education and the mediocrity of the country’s universities 
and their lack of participation in the innovation cycle. On possible remedies, Spain faces a 
familiar, longstanding left-right division. When a regional PP functionary speaks about a lack 
of discipline and lower standards in schools and intellectuals close to PSOE or Podemos 
complain about the atrocious effects of publicly funded private schools on equality, you might 
as well be in the United States, the UK, France or … nearly anywhere where education policy 
has become highly politicised. Ciudadanos and, to some extent, PSOE are trying to push a 
6 | MIROSLAV BEBLAVÝ 
 
third way of technocratic reform, but – given the power of trade unions in PSOE and of the 
Church in PP – this is not going to be an easy task.  
On universities and innovation, the ideological divide is much less relevant, but that is true in 
many other places that have nonetheless not managed to make much progress. A foreign-
educated academic declared it essentially impossible to get employed at a university without 
being ‘home-grown’. Given the salary levels and the environment, however, she was not much 
interested anyway. Spain thus has a pool of highly educated innovators and internationally 
successful firms, but research (Santana et al., 2016) shows that allocation of capital to firms by 
the financial sector had essentially zero correlation with how well they were able to use it. 
What economists euphemistically called “product market competition” also remains a big 
challenge for Spain.  
It is here that the ‘policy’ and ‘governance’ challenges of Spain interact most visibly. It is not 
corruption per se that is the biggest problem, but rather a culture of connections instead of 
meritocracy, not to mention an emphasis on regulation and risk aversion rather than on 
competition between individuals as well as between firms.  
For some time now, Spain has had a two-tiered labour market, consisting on the one hand of 
insiders with permanent contracts and high employment protection and of outsiders, on the 
other, who are either unemployed or who cycle between temporary contracts. Atrocious levels 
of unemployment (26% at its peak in 2013) and a relatively strong consensus among elites on 
the need for change enabled the PP government to carry out partial liberalisation with mixed 
success. Employment is growing strongly and the unemployment rate is expected to drop 
below 20% this year or next.  
The reality of the Spanish labour market, however, has changed much less than the laws. 
Wage-setting mechanisms, active labour market reform and labour contracts need significant 
modernisation, on which there seems to be broad agreement behind the scenes, but a big 
conflict once leaders step onto the stage. This is a policy area that will probably depend 
strongly on the shape of the new government. In particular, Podemos’ participation in 
government is likely to prevent further changes and could even mean a reversal of some of 
the previous policy measures. 
Labour market reform is also inextricably tied to the governance issues and regionalism. Spain 
has ineffective active labour market policies, which are largely focused on job creating 
subsidies. Experts agree that a shift to investment in human capital that facilitates a 
reallocation of labour to growing sectors and enterprises is essential. Such a strategy, however, 
requires a much more effective state either as regulator or as purchaser; otherwise, the 
expenditure could be even less effective than the job subsidies.  
On wage-setting, the PP government has tried to push wage bargaining from the regional and 
sectoral level more to the individual firm level to take into account different levels of 
productivity and market success. While many firms took advantage of temporary measures 
that allowed them to opt out of more centralised arrangements in times of economic difficulty, 
there is much less uptake of options for more long-term and systematic decentralisation of 
collective bargaining.  
Without further reform, there is no reason to believe that Spain can drive unemployment 
below its long-term average rate of 15% or maybe not even that far. Its urgency therefore 
remains unabated, regardless of the current employment growth. 
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The country has been through a number of corruption scandals in recent years, which 
frequently revolve around a toxic mixture of real estate development, government-owned 
banks and zoning regulations. Regional and local politicians have been implicated in a number 
of these scandals, but some issues reach all the way to the top. It is these scandals that have 
led many Spaniards to believe that all politicians, despite ostensible policy differences, are 
simply members of a corrupt and self-serving La Casta.  
To foreign observers and many members of the domestic elite, this seems slightly 
overwrought. The Spanish state is different from the Italian or Greek state. The central civil 
service receives high marks for cleanliness, quality and stability, and law enforcement 
institutions have shown themselves to be able to stand up to political corruption. There 
appears to be very little if any corruption at the retail level, whether in education, healthcare 
or other services.  
As both the Spanish and the Irish cases showed, however, even limited governance and 
corruption problems can nearly destroy the state, if they are concentrated in important areas 
(e.g. the financial sector) and if they are allowed to get out of hand. Also, given the high level 
of decentralisation in Spain, the probity and quality of regional governments are of paramount 
concern. The crisis appears to be shifting the culture towards both vigorous monitoring of the 
state by the civil society and zero tolerance towards any abuse. Even though such a stance may 
be traumatic in the short run, it will, if sustained, lead to a new equilibrium of much less 
corruption and a partial restoration of public confidence. 
Will this crisis go to waste? 
Spain now has a new generation of leaders. With the exception of Prime Minister Rajoy, all the 
major party leaders are between 35 and 45 years of age. This is exceptional by nearly any 
standard. It also has a vigorous public debate on key policy issues and the political parties are 
learning to live within the new 3D political puzzle. In the past five years, successive 
governments have taken significant efforts to “save Spain from the troika”, as one economist 
put it.  
Nonetheless, there is a lot of scepticism in Madrid about the ability of any new government to 
take on the crucial modernisation challenges. My personal view is slightly more optimistic.  
The most positive sign is that – even with 3% economic growth – an appetite for far-reaching 
change is still in the air. It is true that desire for a broader shift towards meritocracy and 
competition is not universal. But Ciudadanos’ swift rise in the polls is linked to the fact that it 
is a strong proponent of such an approach. Podemos is both more radical vis-à-vis the current 
political system and similar to SYRIZA in focusing more on obtaining and consolidating 
power than on specific reforms. Under pressure from the upstarts, both traditional parties are 
evolving, although insiders from each were very vocal in their criticism of the level of 
institutional sclerosis. 
If Spain can repeat its ascension to the Champions’ League – but this time on a more 
sustainable and long-term basis – it will hold many lessons for other ambitious policy-makers 
from Southern and Central and Eastern Europe. If not, mediocre policy performance, a high 
level of public debt and a slow-growth European environment can make for long-term misery.  
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